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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Henry Sanchez, Jr., appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence
against him for, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1), pursuant to his Judgment of Conviction
thereon. (R. 118-122).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Appellant

Henry

Sanchez,

Jr.

was

charged

with

Possession

of

Methamphetamine, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1) by way of Complaint filed July 1, 2010.
(R. 13-14).

Mr. Sanchez filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support on August
2, 2010, along with a supporting affidavit. (R. 85-89). The District Court, the Honorable
John K. Butler presiding, held argument on the motion on June 28, 2010. (Tr., pp. 4-26).
Officer Kenneth Rushing testified that while on patrol, he saw what he thought
were two juveniles "messing with a car". (Prelim. Tr., p. 5). At the hearing on motion to
suppress, he testified that as he was driving past a parking lot, he szr.-1 two boys on
bicycles, who ducked down behind a car. (Tr., p. 20, Lines. 18-19). He also described
the encounter in his testimony as a "traffic stop". (Tr., p. 18, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 1).
Officer Baker testified at the suppression hearing that he saw two people on
bicycles near an automobile in a dark parking lot. As he turned around, the individuals
fled. (Tr., p. 8, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 5).

1

In a memorandum opinion dated July 12, 2010, the district court denied Mr.
Sanchez's Motion to Suppress. (R. 135-141 ). As stated above, Mr. Sanchez
subsequently entered his plea, upon which the Court sentenced him. (R. 2C8-215).
Mr. Sanchez filed a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 (R., 216228), which the court denied without hearing. (R., 237-239). Mr. Sanchez timely filed
his appeal. (R. 240-244).

11.
ISSUES

A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence?
8.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of
seven years with 2 years fixed, 5 years indeterminate upon Mr. Sanchez following his
plea of guilty?
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Sanchez's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence?

111.
ARGUMENT

A The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v.

Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).

?

The Supreme Court has often stated that warrantless searches and seizures are
per se unreasonable absent consent or exigent circumstances.

Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Both the Idaho and

Federal Constitutions require a proper warrant to be issued in order to justify a search:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be s,Jized. Amend.
IV, U.S. Constitution.
The Defendant has the initial burden of proof to make a prima facie
showing of illegality. See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. Cal.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); United States

v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. Cal. 1977). Once the Defendant makes this showing,
the burden shifts to the government to show the existence of some justification of the
presumptively illegal search and seizure. Wong Sun

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83

S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Further, a seizure occurs and continues when an officer restrains an individual so
that considering all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct
would communicate to a reasonable person that she is not at liberty w g:) about her
business. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650-51, 51 P.3d 461 (2002)
A brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer, is governed by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), under which an officer who has a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief stop. While "reasonable

suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least a
minimal level of objective justification for the stop. A Terry stop must

oe based

on a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person in question either has or is about to
commit a crime. State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 41 P.3d 744 (Ct. App. 2002).

In this case, Mr. Sanchez was simply in a parking lot near a vehicle.

The

testimony in the record is conclusory at best. No "reasonable, articulable, suspicion"
was testified to.

Rather, the district court relied on the officer's conclusory statement

that he saw what he thought were two juveniles "messing with a car". {Prelim. Tr., p. 5).
Inherent in such an analysis is the requirement that there be testimony and
record sufficient to make such a finding. As stated above, other than the presence of
the individuals in a parking lot near a car, no articulation of facts dupporting a
reasonable suspicion occurred. The state did not support the officer's conclusion with
any facts. Therefore, the record does not support the district court's conclusion that
there was a sufficient basis for a Terry stop.
Unlike Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), here, there was no facts
regarding any criminal activity on which to base a suspicion. Here, one officer testified
he "thought" they might be messing with a car, and the other officer testified he
"thought" they might be burglarizing a car. The officers' subjective thoughts, without any
testimony regarding independent facts upon which to form a suspicion, do not support
even a Terry stop type of encounter.
Likewise, no actual facts regarding the alleged "flight" by Mr. Sanchez were
testified to.

Instead, the Officer Baker simply stated in conclusory fasr,,on that the
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individuals on bicycles ufled". (Tr., p. 8, L 24 ~ p. 19, L. 5). No other testimony regarding
the alleged flight exists in the record. The testimony that does exist amounts to one
sentence which simply states a conclusion. Such a conclusion, without some
articulation of facts, is not sufficient to justify a detention or seizure.
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme Court held that when an
officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id., dt /498. And any
"refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437
(1991 ).
Likewise in this case, the record contains no articulated facts or evidence upon
which to base even a Terry stop. Therefore, Mr. Sanchez was fre5e to leave the scene,
and his leaving, even if in a hurried manner, doe not furnish the minimal level of
objective justification required for a detention or seizure,
Once Mr. Sanchez was forced to return to what one officer described as a "traffic
stop", clearly Mr. Sanchez was seized, and in custody. Again, other than the presence
in the parking lot, and the fact that Mr. Sanchez had left, no facts are present in the
record to support any sort of stop or detention.
There was no testimony of any sort of independent factors constituting probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion regarding Mr. Sanchez. Therefore the evidence
obtained from the resulting search of Mr. Sanchez's jacket should have been
suppressed.

fi

Under these facts, the trial court should be reversed, the conviction overturned
and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Seven
Years, Two Fixed And Five Indeterminate Upon Mr. Sanchez, Following His
Admission Plea of Guilty.

Mr. Sanchez's history, and the facts of this case, present mitigating
circumstances indicating a need for temperance in sentencing.

Nevertheless, the

district court imposed seven years upon Mr. Sanchez. Mr. Sanchez asserts that the
district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors and, thus, abused its
discretion, considering his personal circumstances.
Mr. Sanchez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentsnce of seven
years is excessive for his charge. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court conducts an
independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 {Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme Court states:
the general objectives of sentence review are:

i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the se~.tencing
power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; a, 1d
(]v) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing
which are both rational and just

State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144-145, 814 P.2d 401, 404-405 (1991 ), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), (citing
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-385, 582 P.2d 728, 730-731 (1978) a~d quoting ABA

Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held, '"[w]here a semer:::;e is within
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294,
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997), quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71,
75 (1979).

Mr. Sanchez does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum.

Rather, Mr. Sanchez contends that in light of the governing criteria, the

sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id., citing State v.

Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled on other grounds

by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). The gov~rriing criteria, or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilit,;ltion; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384,
582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
Although Mr. Sanchez's history presented mitigating circumstances and reasons
for mercy, and a recommendation by the prosecutor for probation, the court sentenced
this very young man on his first felony dui to a seven year unified sentence. Mr.
Sanchez was at the time of original sentencing an 59 year old man. (PSI p.1 ). He was
born on

(PSI p.1.) He is a father and a grandfather,- (PSI p.4-5.)
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Additionally, the issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses
remorse has been addressed in several cases. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824
P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is
required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of
his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his
character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a
defendant's term of imprisonment because the defendant expressed regret for what he
had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529, (1982). In the
present case, by the time of sentencing, Mr. Sanchez, indicated remorse by his
willingness to get treatment and join a mission. (PSI p.9.)
In light of the facts of the his case and of his personal circumstances, Mr.
Sanchez asserts that the district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating
factors, considered improper factors
C.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Sanchez Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251,253,869 P.2d 568,570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21,
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Pope, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869
(Ct.App.1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id., citing Pope, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was

R

not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing
State

v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991 ).
Here, new information concerning Mr. Sanchez was provided from him directly in

his motion. (R., 216-228). The new information was that the longer fixed portion of the
sentence was preventing Mr. Sanchez from entering the therapeutic community as
otherwise recommended by the district court.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21,
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 ..680 P.2d 869
(Ct.App.1984 ). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If th6 Sf'Jntence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991 ).

It is Mr. Sanchez's position that because the district court originally
recommended that he be placed in the therapeutic community, and because the length
of the sentence was preventing such placement, failure to reduce his sentence is an
abuse of discretion.

Therefore, he respectfully contends that the district court should have reduced
his sentence pursuant to the Rule 35 motion because the sentence was excessive as
originally imposed, and because the length of the sentence was preventing him from
entering the therapeutic community. His further arguments in support of this assertion
are found in section ll(C) above, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated
herein by reference.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trisl court's denial
of his motion to suppress, that his conviction also be reversed, and the matter
remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Sanchez further respectfully requests that if this
Court does not grant the afore requested relief, that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new ser.tencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.

DATED this 17th day of February, 2012.

UJ()__
STEf>HEN6. THOMPSON
Appellate Public Defender
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